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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN TE SUPREME
COURT: THE FUTURE LIES AHEAD

Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
We are now going to return to the consideration of the First
Amendment decisions of the Supreme Court of the last term. To
discuss those cases, we have the Associate Dean of Brooklyn
Law School, who has been a consistent participant in our
programs. His presentations, and ultimately the written version
of them in the Touro Law Review, have always been of great
interest to members of the audience. Professor Joel Gora is
general counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union. He has
been national staff counsel to the New York Civil Liberties
Union, has served as a clerk in the Second Circuit, and has
authored a book The Right To Protest.1 He is undoubtedly one of
the leading authorities in the country regarding the First
Amendment. It is my pleasure now to present to you Professor
Joel Gora.*

INTRODUCTION
Dean Joel M. Gora:
Thank you, Judge Lazer. It's a pleasure to be here. I feel that
with my colleague, Will Hellerstein, following me in the batting
order, I should welcome you to the Brooklyn Law School portion
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.

1. JOEL M. GORA ETAL., THE RIGHT TO PROTEST (1991).
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of the program. But we are delighted to be here. Normally,
Hellerstein goes first, and then I get to say that he is such a tough
act to follow. This time I go first, and I am pleased at the
opportunity.
Last year, at this conference, I described the Court's 1994 term
as a championship season for the First Amendment, 2 with seven
of eight cases 3 resulting in a victory for the constitutional
claimant. This year there were fewer cases, five altogether, but
with the same basic bottom line. The First Amendment claim
completely prevailed in four of the five cases, and won on two
out of three issues in the fifth case. 4 It sounds almost like a clean
sweep for free speech. Indeed, some commentators have even
characterized the Court as "the fiercest defender of the First
Amendment in history." 5 Although some friends of the First
Amendment have begun to question whether the Court gives too
much protection to free speech, I am not in that camp. Rather, I
have never met a First Amendment victory that I didn't like. In
that regard, there was much to take heart from in this year's
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id.
3. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454
(1995): McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co.. 514 U.S. 476 (1995): Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp.. 513 U.S. 374 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia, 115
S. Ct. 2510 (1995); Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995);
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). The Court upheld
the First Amendment claims in the first seven cases and denied the claim in the
eighth case.
4. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996);
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County,
Kansas v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996): O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v.
City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996). Denver Area Educ.
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
116 S.Ct. 2374 (1996).
5. Burt Neuborne, Pushing Free Speech Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1996, at A13.
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term. In the commercial speech case, Justice Stevens wrote a
powerful opus condemning governmental paternalism about what
information consumers should have, 6 and Justice Thomas wrote
an equally uncompromising concurring opinion. 7 In the cable
decency case, Justice Kennedy, the Court's foremost First
Amendment advocate, wrote a classic opinion urging equal
protection for categories of protected speech. 8 In the campaign
finance 9 case, Justice Thomas wrote a sweeping opinion
6. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1495 (holding that a Rhode Island
statute that prohibited all price advertising of alcoholic beverages violated the
First Amendment because this complete restriction of truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech was not the least restrictive means available for
achieving the state's goal of promoting temperate alcohol consumption). Id. In
his opinion, Justice Stevens observed:
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or
overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that
the public will respond "irrationally" to the truth. The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good.
Id. at 1508.
7. 44 Liquonnart. Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1515-20 (19961 (Thomas. J..
concurring). Justice Thomas espoused the view that the government may never
claim a "legitimate interest" in concealing information about the legal use of a
product in order to decrease the sale of it. Id.
8. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium. Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2404 (1996).
9. Colorado Republican Fed. Canzpaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2309. In
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Conun.. the Committee ran several radio
commercials and published two pamphlets prior to the state Republican
nomination alleging inconsistencies in the Democratic senatorial candidate's
views and voting records. Id. at 2312. The Federal Election Commission.
acting on a complaint from the Colorado Democratic party. concluded that one
of the radio spots was a "coordinated expenditure" - an expenditure made in
behalf of a particular candidate. Id. Justice Thomas concluded that a provision
that limits political parties' financial support of congressional candidates cannot
survive the strict judicial scrutiny mandated for such First Amendment cases.
Id. at 2311. The Court determined that if the expenditure was in fact
independent in nature it would violate the First Amendment to apply the
restrictions in this case. Id. at 2315.
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condemning all governmental restrictions of political funding as
deplorable violations of the core First Amendment protection of
political speech 1 0 -- a position identical to that advocated by the
card-carrying members of the ACLU.
But none of these strong opinions spoke for the Court.
Although the First Amendment claimants prevailed by relatively
lopsided votes in the five cases, the lopsidedness of the results
belied the decided divergence of approaches toward the reasons
for the results. Indeed, on only one issue were there opinions for
the entire Court: namely, the new recognition of First
Amendment rights of independent government contractors. That
was a landmark ruling that has powerful implications for local
government. Powerful opinions were written reaffirming and
extending the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine as it
limits government's power to penalize employees, beneficiaries,
and now, independent contractors, for exercising their freedom of
speech and association.
Despite the lopsided free speech victories, however, I
wondered why I was not happier and why the term left me with a
vague sense of unease about where the Court was going on these
issues. It was a little like lite beer: "tastes great, less filling," but
still something missing.
My unease flowed from the fact that the dominant middle on
the Court seems decidedly unwilling to take hard, categorical
approaches to First Amendment doctrine. Instead, the prevailing
pluralities seem more comfortable opting for softer, ad hoc
adjudications. looking for ways to defer to majoritarian and
political branches and accommodate the need to address societal
problems with the duty to honor constitutional imperatives, using
the First Amendment only as a last resort rather than as a first
principle in dealing with governmental restrictions of
communication. The three Justices who comprise that center are
Justices Souter, O'Connor and Breyer, and my sense is that the
emerging leader of that triumvirate is the newest Justice, Justice
Breyer. His biography and methodology reinforce each other.
10. Id. at 2326-27.
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Having been a Senate Legislative Counsel and an expert on
administrative law and government regulation, he eschews
categorical resolutions in favor of interim adjudications.I' One
can see that in his plurality opinion in the campaign finance case
and, most powerfully, in his plurality opinion in the cable
decency case. Indeed, if one compares the interim approach of
his opinion with the categorical approach in Justice Kennedy's
opinion, one can see a microcosm of the difference between the
common law model of adjudication and the administrative law legal process model of adjudication. If I may be so bold, I think
the contrast between these two styles suggest broader themes and
implications: for in Justice Kennedy's classic, common law
approach we see the confidence of modernism, while in Justice
Breyer's more contemporary administrative law approach we see
the stance of post-modernism, where certainty is questioned and
contingency is expected. But more about that later.
Another theme that I noticed regarding the Court's five First
Amendment cases is one that reminds me of a Raymond Chandler
novel. In his novels, the plot line usually involves some horrible
thing that happened twenty or twenty-five years ago that was
covered up and unknown. It emerges now and becomes the basis
for the plot. Well. twenty or twenty-five years ago was actually
twenty years ago - 1976. In order to understand what the Court
did in 1996, one has to go back to 1976. Each of the major First
Amendment issues before the Court this past term is a reprise of
themes originally sounded twenty years ago, and the Court has
struggled with them ever since.
This year's commercial speech case, 12 for example, which
invalidated Rhode Island's total ban on advertising of liquor and
beer prices, is rooted in the Court's 1976 ruling in Virginia State

11. Justice Breyer was a Professor at Harvard Law School from 1967 to
1981. He served as Chief Counsel to the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee from 1979 to 1981.
12. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 166 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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Board of Pharmacy.13 In that case, the Court first recognized
broad protection for commercial speech and struck down a
Virginia ban on any advertising of prescription drugs by
pharmacies. Since then, the Court has wrestled with the issue of
how much protection to afford commercial speech. The outcome
of this battle is of great importance to state and local
governments which seek to regulate commercial advertising in a
wide variety of ways.
Two cases this term involved whether the First Amendment
gives independent government contractors the right to be free
from political retaliation by government agencies and officials.
Those cases trace their origins to another 1976 decision, Elrod v.
Burns. 14 which was the first case to hold that the time-honored
practice of political patronage can violate the First Amendment
when it results in the firing of a public employee who belongs to
the losing political party. 15 Since then, the Court has relentlessly
expanded that ruling and the results this term are a significant
watershed in that development. In doing so, the Court has had to
decide whether the political speech and association of government
employees, workers and contractors were subject to the
regulatory regime of control reflected in cases like Letter
Carriers,16 which held that civil service employees had less
political freedom than average citizens, and Red Lion
Broadcasting Company v. FCC,17 which held that broadcasters
13. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer

Council. Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
consumers of prescription drugs challenged the validity of a Virginia statute
that provided that a pharmacist is guilty of unprofessional conduct for
advertising the prices of prescription drugs. Id. at 749. The Court concluded

that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protections and invalidated
the Virginia statute on that basis. Id. at 757.
14. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).

15. Id. at 348.
16. United States Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973). In Letter Carriers, the Court upheld Hatch Act restrictions on active
involvement in partisan political campaigns by federal civil service employees.
17. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, a book author, pursuant to the fairness doctrine,

1997]

FIRST AMEADMENT

359

had less editorial freedom than newspaper publishers; or, rather,
to the principles of cases like New York Times v. Sullivan18 and

Cohen v. California,19 which extolled the values of unfettered
free speech by a free press and a free people.
Campaign funding controls pose a very similar foundational
First Amendment question. Should those laws be subject to the
more forgiving doctrines of cases like Red Lion and Letter
Carriers, on the theory that government can modulate the
political funding and regulate the political speech of those who
seek government power, or the more unyielding instincts of cases
like Times v. Sullivan and Cohen v. California which are deeply
intolerant of government efforts to modulate political speech and
communication. Ever since the Buckley v. Valeo ruling in
demanded free air time to reply to personal attacks. Id. at 372. The Supreme
Court ruled that nothing in the First Amendment prohibited requiring a
broadcaster to share its frequency with others to allow them to express the
views of the community. Id. at 389.
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Respondent alleged that he had been defamed in
a full page advertisement published by the New York Times on March 29,
1960. Id. Although the advertisement did not mention respondent by name, he
contended that the word "police" referred to him as the Commissioner who
supervised the police department. Id. The Court articulated a standard to
determine when to "award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct." Id. at 283. Proof of actual
malice in publishing the falsehood was deemed necessary for an award of
damages for libel. Id. The Supreme Court held that the advertisement was an
impersonal attack on governmental operations, and to allow a libel cause of
action for an official responsible for those operations is constitutionally
impermissible. Id. at 292.
19. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen. the defendant, as
n expression of protest against the Vietnam War, wore a jacket on which the
words "Fuck the Draft" were clearly written. Id. at 16. He wore the jacket in
the hallway of the Los Angeles County Courthouse, were he was consequently
arrested. Id. The defendant was ultimately convicted of disturbing the peace
pursuant to a California statute that prohibited "offensive conduct." Id. The
Court held that the defendant's right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, was violated. Id. It concluded that
more compelling reasons are required in order to charge an individual with
criminally offensive conduct. Id. at 26.
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1976,20 where the Court held that candidates and causes have an
unqualified right to spend money to communicate their messages,
but only a qualified right to raise money for such
21
communications, the Court has struggled with those issues.
This term's Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
case 22 was no different, and the Court took care of some
unfinished business from Buckley by holding that campaign
expenditures by political parties, which are not made in
coordination with the favored party candidate, may not be
23
restricted or restrained.
Finally, the decision in the cable decency case traces its
doctrinal heritage to the 1976 decision in Young v. American
Mini-Theatres,24 where a divided Court held that sexual speech,
though not legally obscene, was nonetheless entitled to lesser
constitutional protection and could be subjected to more
pervasive government regulation than political speech. That was
a case of interest to local governments. It involved whether or
not the city government can zone those bookstores and theaters
that produce sexually-oriented materials differently under the
First Amendment. 25 These were not obscene materials, which
could be banned completely, but rather sexually-oriented
materials. They would be treated differently under the First
Amendment -- the answer in the Young case was basically
"yes." '2 6 In essence, you can treat lesser, lower forms of
sexually-oriented political speech differently than you could treat
other forms, even though they were both theoretically entitled to
First Amendment protection. 27 That ruling was, in turn followed
two years later in the broadcast decency case, Paciflca

20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 28-33.
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.. 116 S. Ct. at 2309.
Id. at 2315.
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 70-71.
Id.
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Foundation,28 which was the direct doctrinal predecessor of the
cable decency case. Like the commercial speech case, the
prominent theme here is whether all "protected" speech is entitled
to equal protection. Or to paraphrase that great enemy of political
correctness, George Orwell, do we say that all categories of
protected speech are equal, but some are more equal than
others? 29
One controversial feature of the 1976 cases was what I would
call the expansion-dilution debate. Those who wanted to expand
the scope of the First Amendment beyond its core of political
speech to encompass commercial and sexual speech, or to expand
the nature of First Amendment protection beyond political
messages to include the funding of such messages, argued for a
unitary concept of the First Amendment. They insisted that a
rising tide raised all boats and that the protection of new forms or
types of speech would only add to the protection of the traditional
political categories. However, others worried that expansion
would lead to dilution and that the Court, if it admitted "lesser"
kinds of speech into the charmed circle, would, understandably,
give that speech "lesser" protection. That "lesser" protection
would ultimately become a blight on the First Amendment
landscape and be used to justify regulation of political speech as
well. If First Amendment protection got spread around, it would
soon get watered down.
Let us turn to this term's work product to see who was the
better prophet.

28. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation. 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (holding that the Commission's determination that a prerecorded
satiric monologue entitled "Filthy Words" was indecent, and therefore.
statutorily prohibited did not violate the First Amendment rights of the
broadcaster. notwithstanding the fact that the monologue was not "obscene").
29. "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."
GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM, ch. 10 (1945).
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1. 44 LIQUORMART V. RHODE ISLAND 30
Twenty years ago. in the landmark Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy31 case, the Court ruled that Virginia could not ban the
32
truthful advertising of the prices of lawful prescription drugs,
especially when it had the paternalistic purpose of trying to
protect people from themselves. 33 In the 44 Liquormart case this
year, the Court had before it a Rhode Island statute which banned
the truthful advertising of the price of lawfully sold alcoholic
beverages. The statute regulated licensed in-state liquor stores
and also controlled in-state advertising for liquor stores in
adjacent states like Massachusetts and Connecticut. The liquor
store had not even advertised the price of anything, but its
newspaper ad did contain pictures of vodka and rum bottles and
the word "WOW" in large letters, which the state Liquor Control
Administrator concluded was an implied reference to bargain
prices for liquor.
One would have thought that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
would have controlled the 44 Liquormart ruling. But the Court's
commercial speech doctrine had staggered back and forth a good
bit following the Virginia case, so the rationale in the 44
Liquormart case was anything but a foregone conclusion.
Two cases would stand in the way of a quick victory in 44
Liquonnart: the 1980 Central Hudson34 ruling with its four-part

30. 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996).

31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Phannacy, consumers of
prescription drugs challenged the validity of a Virginia statute which provided
that a pharmacist who advertised the prices of such drugs was guilty of

unprofessional conduct. Id. at 749. The Court invalidated the statute,
concluding that this kind of commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protections. Id. at 757.

32. Id. at 756.
33. Id.
34. Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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test 3 5 and the 1985 Posadas3 6 decision with it's "greater/lesser"

rationale.

37

The 1976 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy decision sparked a
good deal of criticism from both the left and the right. The right
charged the Court with judicial activism in extending the scope of
First Amendment well beyond the political realm that the
Framers understood encompassed within the phrase "the freedom
of speech." Who can forget then-Justice Rehnquist's complaint,
dissenting in a 1977 decision which extended First Amendment
protection to the non-prescription sale of condoms, that the
patriots who fought at Bunker Hill and Shiloh to protect and
defend the Constitution would be surprised to learn that it
protected condom sales at gas stations. 3 8 Likewise, the left
complained that giving serious protection to speech offering the
sale of goods and services was a backdoor effort to give
constitutional protection to the sale of goods and services
themselves, and would herald a return to the discredit days of

35. Id. at 566. The first requirement of the four part test is that the speech
at issue "at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. The
second requirement is that "the asserted governmental interest [be]
substantial." Id. The third requirement is that "the regulation directly advance
the governmental interest asserted." Id. The fourth requirement is that the
regulation "not [be] more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."
Id.
36. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc's. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico. 478
U.S. 328 (1986) (holding that a Puerto Rico statute prohibiting the use of the
word "casino" in advertisements was facially constitutional with respect to the
First Amendment in light of the Puerto Rico Superior Court's narrow statutory
interpretation).
37. See infra note 52.
38. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678. 717 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Carey, the Court held that a New York State
law that banned the advertising and display of legal. non-prescription
contraceptives could not pass First Amendment scrutiny on the claim that such
action would serve to embarrass and offend the public and tacitly condone
adolescent sexual activity. Id. at 617, 700.
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Lochner v. New York3 9 when the Court used economic
substantive due process to frustrate populist legislation.
The Court's approach in the 1980 Central Hudson40 case was a
retrenchment from the broader protection of commercial speech
staked out in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. Although the
Court invalidated a complete ban on promotional advertising by
utility companies, the Court did so by fashioning the well-known
four-part test to measure the validity of any restraint on

commercial speech. First, does the speech promote a lawful
product or service in a truthful manner. 4 1 Second, does the
government nonetheless have a substantial interest in preventing
the speech. 42 Third. does the regulation "directly advance" the
governmental interest asserted, 43 and fourth, is the restriction not
44
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.

Although the test has been applied to strike many restrictions
on commercial speech, its malleability is apparent and outcomes

are often in doubt. Thus, for example, the test permitted Puerto
Rico to outlaw advertisements for lawful, regulated gambling
casinos, 45 Florida to prevent lawyers from contacting accident

victims

for one

month, 46 and

Congress

to ban

radio

39. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, a New York
State labor statute prohibited employers from either requiring or permitting
employees of bakeries to work in excess of sixty hours in one week. Id. at 46.
The Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the rights of
employees and employers to enter into contracts for the sale and purchase of
labor respectively, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 53.
40. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Posadas, 478 U.S. 328.
46. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). In Florida
Bar, an attorney and a lawyer referral service brought suit alleging that a
Florida Bar regulation, which prohibited the use of direct mail to solicit
potential clients in personal injury and wrongful death matters within thirty
days of the incident giving rise to the claim, violated the First Amendment. Id.
at 2374. The Court deemed the rule constitutional, observing that the Bar had a
substantial interest in safeguarding the privacy and well-being of victims and
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advertisements for legal state lotteries, where the radio station
47
broadcast from a state which had not legalized lotteries.
On the other hand, last year, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Company, 48 a unanimous Court had struck down another
commercial speech/alcoholic beverage restriction, a federal
statute which outlawed putting the alcohol content on a can of
beer. That is why the stage appeared to be set for a possible
reconsideration of the Central Hudson formula. However, a
majority could not be mustered for that revision. Instead, on most
of the key doctrinal issues, Justice Stevens' opinion spoke only
for shifting pluralities, rather than for the Court.
First, he sought to break out of the box whereby all
commercial speech restrictions are judged by the same Central
Hudson test by insisting that the Court be more discerning about
the nature of and reasons for the restriction at issue:

family members during this period, as well as in preserving the dignity of the
legal profession. Id. at 2374-75. The Court concluded that the rule in question
would advance these interests substantially and was sufficiently narrow in
scope. Id. at 2374.
47. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In
Edge, the Court held that federal statutes prohibiting the radio broadcasting of
lottery advertising by licensees located in non-lottery states serve to balance the
interests of lottery and nonlottery states. Id. at 428. This balancing applies
even when the radio station is located in a non-lottery state but has signals
which reach into the lottery state. Id. at 435. The Court held that the

prohibitive statutes were not more extensive than necessary in order to enforce
the restriction in nonlottery states but not interfere with the policy of the lottery
states. Id. at 435-36.
48. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). In Rubin, a brewer applied to the Federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for approval of proposed beer labels
which would display alcohol content. Section 5(e) (2) of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol content. Id.
at 1588. The brewer sued on the ground that this prohibition was a violation of
the brewer's First Amendment protection of commercial speech. Id. The
Government's defense of deterring "strength wars" among brewers, although
deemed "substantial," was held by the Court to violate the First Amendment
by failing to advance that interest in a direct and material way. Id. at 1594.
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When a State regulates commercial messages to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer
information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However,
when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason
to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands. 49
Applying this distinction, the plurality would rule that total
bans that target truthful, non-misleading commercial messages
rarely protect consumers and usually impede debate over central
issues of public policy: "The First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the
50
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."
Judged by that standard, the plurality insisted that a "blanket
prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful
product" must be reviewed with special care, requires greater
justification and therefore must be shown to "significantly"
51
achieve its goal of reducing alcohol consumption.
Second, Justice Stevens still only spoke for a plurality in the
critical portions of his opinion which declined deference to
"legislative judgment" about promoting temperance, rejected any
"vice exception" to commercial speech protection and abandoned
the "greater/lesser" approach of the Posadas gambling casino
case. 52 Under that reasoning, since the State has the "greater"
power to ban casino gambling (or liquor consumption), it has the
"lesser" power to ban or regulate even truthful advertising of the
49. 44Liquormart,Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1515.

50. Id. at 1515. Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg
agreed with Justice Stevens' position. Id.
51. Id. at 1501.
52. Id. at 1499-50. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46. In Posadas, the

Court concluded that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
Id.
I...
gambling .
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casino gambling (or liquor consumption). Justice Stevens harshly
attacked that reasoning as insensitive to the distinction between
regulation of conduct and regulation of speech, and indifferent to
the well-settled unconstitutional conditions doctrine that bars the
State from conditioning a liquor store license on surrender of free
53
speech rights.
Finally, Justice Stevens did pick up a majority of the Court in
54
his rejection of the notion that the Twenty-first Amendment
gives States additional substantive power over rights otherwise
protected by the First Amendment, and in his conclusion that
Rhode Island had failed to "carry its heavy burden of justifying
its complete ban on price advertising. . . ."55 However. since
Justices Breyer and Souter defected on most issues, the general
effort to elevate the protection of commercial speech to the level
of political speech, and to move the law from Central Hudson
56
back to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, fell short.
Although Justice Thomas joined key portions of Justice
Stevens' opinion, he would have taken an even more stringent
view of the state's power to regulate truthful information about
lawful products and services. Like Justice Blackmun before him,
Justice Thomas insisted that "all attempts to dissuade legal
choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible"
and urged the Court to abandon the watered-down Central
Hudson formula and return to the clearer rule of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy. Justice Thomas' performance as an advocate
57
of powerful protection for commercial speech was impressive.

53. 44Liquormart,Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1512-13.

54. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Twenty-first Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The transportation or importation into any State. Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id.

55. 44Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1502.
56. Id. at 1520. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Souter
joined in a concurring opinion, delivered by Justice O'Connor. Id.
57. Id. at 1515-20. (Thomas J., concurring). Justice Thomas espoused the
view that the government may never claim a "legitimate" interest in concealing
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Finally, however, four Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer) saw no need to revisit or
question the Central Hudson framework. The concurring Justices
focused instead on the conclusion that Rhode Island had failed to
show that there was a reasonable fit between the means of
banning price advertising and the end of encouraging temperance,
especially in light of less burdensome alternatives such as
58
increasing sales taxes on liquor.
Last year, in commenting on the beer strength case, I observed
that Joe Camel was breathing a sigh of relief. Now that Big
Daddy Bill Clinton has sicced his FDA on Joe Camel, what does
the 44 Liquormart decision add to the mix? As you may know,
the FDA has imposed a number of regulatory restrictions on the
speech of tobacco companies, including regulation of the content
and format of advertising (no glossy billboards near schools, but
text only; no color ads in magazines read by kids; no logos on
59
hats and horns or party favors, no Virginia Slim tournaments).
Apart from the question of the substantive FDA power over
tobacco, how will these proposals fare on First Amendment
grounds?
Even though there was no commanding majority in the liquor
price case, the broad restrictions in the tobacco regulations
constitute the kind of blatant content and format controls that
would seem to be suspect under either the plurality or
concurrence approaches. Even though kids are being protected,
under-age drinking was also a concern in the 44 Liquormart case
as well. Otherwise, the government will have to find ways less

information about the legal use of a product in order to decrease the sale of it.
Id.
58. Id. at 1515.
59. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396,
44582 (proposed 1996). "The agency proposed ... to prohibit outdoor
advertising, including but not limited to billboards, posters, or placards, placed
within 1,000 feet of any public playground or playground in a public park,
elementary school, or secondary school." Id. "The agency is requiring that all
permissive outdoor advertising be in a black and white, text-only format." Id.
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burdensome on speech to encourage kids (and adults) not to
smoke. Just Say No.
II. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
WABAUNSEE COUNTY, KANSAS V. UMBEHR; 60
O'HARE TRUCK SERVICE, INC. V. NORTHLAKE,
ILLINOIS6 1
I think it is not an understatement to say that the next pair of
cases I will discuss will have far and away the greatest impact on
local government of any First Amendment decisions in recent
years. These are landmark cases that particularly impact local
government. The trend toward downsizing, outsourcing and
privatization of government services means that more and more
people will relate to government as independent contractors, not
as government employees. The two cases this term raised the
issue of whether such independent contractors can invoke the
protections of the First Amendment in their dealings with
government.
I found it very interesting and helpful this morning to think
about these cases, as Judge Pratt suggested, not only as First
Amendment cases but also in terms of a broader notion of
retaliatory mistreatment of people. Singling out somebody for
harmful adverse treatment because of his or her status or a
protected activity that was engaged in is what was going on in
60. 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996). Respondent had been the exclusive trash
contractor in Wabaunsee County, Kansas since 1985. Id. Mr. Umbehr asserted
that his contract was terminated in retaliation for his openly criticizing the
County Board's policy with regard to landfill user rates. Id. The Court found
that "independent contractors appear to lie somewhere between the case of
government employees, who have the closest relationship with the government.

and ... persons with less close relationships with the government." Id. at
2350. The First Amendment was thus held to protect independent contractors

from retaliatory dismissal in the same way that employees are protected. Id. at
2352.
61. 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
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these cases. You had, in most instances, people who had the
status of independent contractors with the government. The issue
in the Umbehr case 62 was whether a contractor who hauls trash
for the county can lose his contract for trashing the county's
policies in the public forum. 63 The issue in the O'Hare case 64
was whether a contractor who tows wrecks from the highway can
65
lose his contract with the city for refusing to tow the party line.
In both cases the Supreme Court held that the contractor was
entitled to invoke the protections of the First Amendment against
such political retaliation.
These are really, despite the jocularity, very important cases. I
almost want to call them "watershed" cases. They involve a mass
of important First Amendment law: retaliation issues, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the right to belong to
whatever political party you choose, and the right to speak your
mind on public issues and be free from punishment unless the
government has a good reason to punish you. A whole wealth
and cluster, about three-hundred pages of case law, is put into a
new area and applied. The area is the government's relationship
with independent contractors. That has never been done before,
and it really is a landmark watershed event. It means that any
dealing, in effect, between the government and a contractor
involving a possible claim of First Amendment retaliation or of
First Amendment victimization or influence becomes a
cognizable claim under these two cases.
The story starts a generation ago, in 1968, when the Warren
Court was riding high in its protection of political speech, and
particularly when it takes the form of citizen criticism of
government policies. From New York Times v. Sullivan66 through
Garrison v. Louisiana67 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 68 the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
violate

116 S. Ct. at 2345.
Id.
116 S. Ct. at 2355.
Id. at 2356.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
379 U.S. 64 (1964). A Louisiana criminal libel statute was held to
the defendant's First Amendment Right to Free Expression by directing

1997]

FIRST AMENDMENT

Warren Court had begun to emphasize that individuals, be they

public employees or private citizens, could not routinely be
punished, criminally or civilly, for their lawful, peaceful
criticism of the conduct of government or the actions of its
officials. It seemed only natural, therefore, for the Court to hold
in Pickering v. Board of Education69 that a public school teacher
who was dismissed from his job for writing a letter in the local
newspaper criticizing the school board's fiscal policies would be
allowed to invoke the First Amendment to challenge such

retaliation. Recognizing, however, that the government has a
greater interest in the speech and conduct of its employees which
differs from its interest in the speech of average citizens, the
Pickering Court accordingly fashioned a test to balance the offduty interests of its employees as citizens to comment on matters
of public concern and the workplace interest of the government
as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees.
In 1976, the Court took the Pickering concept, that government
workers may not be improperly penalized for otherwise
protected, off-duty First Amendment activity and party
affiliation, and applied it to a practice as old as the Republic,
punishment for true statements made with actual malice. Id. at 77-78. The
defendant District Attorney's criticism of district court judges. who were
deemed inefficient, took many vacations, and failed to approve funds for the
D.A.'s office to combat crime in the city of New Orleans, was criticism of the
official conduct of public officials and criminal libel sanctions would not apply
absent actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 79.
68. 385 U.S. 590 (1967). In Keyishian, faculty members employed by the
State of New York were required to follow a New York plan designed to
prevent "subversive" persons from obtaining state employment. Id. at 591-92.
The faculty members were obligated to sign a certificate indicating that they
had never been Communists. Id. at 592. The Court held that the subsections
requiring these signatures were invalid insofar as "they proscribe mere
knowing membership without any showing of specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of the Communist Party of the U.S. or of the State of New
York." Id. at 609-10.
69. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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namely, political patronage. In Elrod v. Burns,70 the Court held
that a newly elected Democratic sheriff could not discharge
several Republican employees such as process servers and
bailiffs, where such positions were not of a policymaking or
confidential nature. The theory was that a public employee's
political association was as protected as that employee's political
speech and should not be penalized without due cause.
Four years later, in 1980, that protection was expanded to limit
patronage dismissals to those few jobs where "the hiring
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved." Applying that rule, the Court invalidated the
patronage dismissal of two deputy public defenders. 7 1 Finally, a
decade later, the Elrod rule was expanded beyond firings of
current employees to encompass other forms of personnel
decisions, such as hiring, promotion, transfer and recall. 72 Now,
in all such circumstances, employees could not be penalized for
not belonging to or supporting the party in power.
Moreover, while the Pickering "balancing" test is very ad hoc
and flexible and contextual, the Elrod "political affiliation" test
tends to be more categorical and rigid, asking only whether party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the particular job

70. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
71. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). In Brand, the respondents,

assistant public defenders, sought a temporary restraining order to prevent
their dismissal because of party affiliation. Id. at 508. When the Democratic
Party took control of the legislature, six of the nine assistants received notices
of termination. Id. at 509-10. The Court held that the respondents are
protected from discharge due solely to their political beliefs pursuant to the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 67.
72. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). Requests
for exceptions from the governor's executive order prohibiting state officials
from making decisions concerning the hiring of an employee were granted or
denied based on who supported the Republican Party. Id. at 65-66. The Court
found that the First Amendment precluded government from making these
decisions on the basis of political belief and held the policy unconstitutional.
Id. at 78.
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categories at issue. Public employers prevail more frequently and
easily in Pickering contests than in Elrod disputes.
In one fell swoop, this year's cases took both the Pickering
balancing test and the Elrod political affiliation rule beyond the
area of government employees and into the uncharted realm of
independent contractors. The Court held that such individuals and
businesses are presumptively protected by the First Amendment
from adverse contract action taken in retaliation for their free
speech activities or partisan political affiliations. The facts in
both cases cried out for some kind of redress, the opinions
marched through the issues impressively, and the methodology
utilized was classic common law making. But some troubling
issues must be addressed.
The Kansas case Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Unbehr73 was
a classic instance of political punishment for the exercise of free
speech. Umbehr had a contract to collect trash and refuse for the
County for several years. The contract provided for automatic
renewal unless one side gave notice of termination 60 days before
the end of the year. According to Umbehr, after he appeared at
County Board meetings to criticize county policy on landfill user
rates and other public matters and published letters to the same
effect in local newspapers, the county served notice of
termination.
The contractor claimed that he had the same rights of free
speech as an ordinary citizen and that the government could not
penalize him unless it could meet the very demanding showing of
the compelling interest test. The County, on the other hand,
argued that there was an even greater need for discretion in the
case of an independent contractor than for an employee whose
work could be supervised close hand. As a consequence, the
county should be free to contract with people it trusted and to
terminate an independent contractor at will.

73. Bd. of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County. Kansas v.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
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The Court took the middle ground. Strongly reaffirming the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which holds that the
government cannot deny a benefit or opportunity to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of
speech. even if he has no entitlement to that benefit, and noting
that it has been repeatedly applied to protect public employees
and beneficiaries from penalty for their protected speech and
association. Justice O'Connor, speaking for a seven to two
Court, nonetheless concluded that the independent contractor was
sufficiently analogous to a public employee for most critical
purposes so as to invoke the Pickering rule and measure the
issues by the balancing test. The Court noted that the balancing
test was sufficiently flexible to protect the contractor's free
speech interest yet accommodate the county's concerns and
recognize whatever relevant differences might exist between an
employee and an independent contractor.
Moreover, the Court went out of its way to assuage the concern
of local government that every adverse contracting decision
would potentially become a First Amendment cause celebre by
noting that Umbehr, like a Pickering claimant public employee,
had a number of hurdles to clear in order to prevail: (1) "[t]o
prevail, Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract
was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an
initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact
that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.
. . ;74 (2) [i]f he can make that showing, the Board will have a
valid defense if it can show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that in light of their knowledge, perceptions and policies at the
time of the termination, the Board members would have
terminated the contract regardless of his speech . . . [citation
omitted]; (3) [t]he Board will also prevail if it can persuade the
District Court that the County's legitimate interests as contractor,
deferentially viewed, outweigh the free speech interests at
stake ... ; (4) if Umbehr prevails, evidence that the Board
74. Id. "To prevail, an employee must prove that the conduct at

issue ... was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination." Id.
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members discovered facts after termination that would have led to
a later termination anyway; 75 and (5) evidence of mitigation of
his loss by means of his subsequent contracts with the cities,
would be relevant in assessing what remedy is appropriate. 76
Furthermore, the Court noted that its ruling was limited to
termination of pre-existing contracts: "Because Umbehr's suit
concerns the termination of a pre-existing commercial
relationship with the government, we need not address the
possibility of suits by bidders or applicants for new government
contracts who cannot rely on such a relationship." 77 But, as the
dissent pointed out, this has been an area of large leaps and
slippery slopes. The Elrod doctrine, fashioned to protect against
firing from employment for one's political affiliations, had
become expanded to cover claimed refusals to hire and promote
as well, and now to cover terminating or refusing to renew
independent contracting relationships also.
Additionally, in the companion case involving our Illinois tow
truck operator who refused to tow the party line, the Court
applied Elrod to an Elrod case, namely penalizing a person for
political affiliation. In the O'Hare case, the Court had to decide
whether an independent contractor who has a contract terminated
or is removed from an official list of authorized contractors in
retaliation for refusing to comply with demands for political
support has a valid First Amendment claim. 78 The answer was
yes, the protections of Elrod and Branti extend to an instance
where government retaliates against a contractor or a provider of
services for the exercise of rights of political association or the
expression of political allegiance. The contractor had refused to
make campaign contributions to the incumbent major. and indeed
75. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347. "The government can escape liability by
showing that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the
protected conduct." Id
76. Id. at 2352.
77. Id.

78. O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake. 116 S. Ct. 2353.
2356 (1996).
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displayed his opponent's campaign posters at his place of
business. That allegation, assumed to be true, was deemed
sufficient to state a claim of political retaliation for political
affiliation.
However, the Court spent most of its time trying to decide how
the case should be categorized. If the termination of the contract
were viewed as retaliation for the contractor's overt or open
exercise of free speech, the more flexible balancing test of
Pickering would apply. But if the matter was viewed as
retaliation for political affiliation alone, then the rather more
rigid Elrod-Branti-Rutanrule would apply. More specifically, the
raw test of political affiliation would suffice to show a
constitutional violation, with the only defense being a showing
that political affiliation was appropriate for the employment in
question. This is a very difficult standard for government to
meet. Where political affiliation alone is concerned, the Court
observed, "one's beliefs and allegiances ought not to be subject
to probing or testing by the government."
The problem is, however, categorizing an "intermixed" case,
i.e., where the free speech at issue is a manifestation of political
affiliation: a sign in the office window supporting the losing
candidate or a bumper sticker on the tow truck to the same
effect? Is that a Pickeringcase or an Elrod case? The answer is: a
Pickering case, subject to a reasonableness, case-by-case
balancing analysis. Finally, even if it were viewed as an Elrod
political affiliation case, there would still have to be an inquiry
into the "reasonableness" of requiring a political affiliation for
the function. The Court remanded for further development and
consideration of the factual record.
Finally, I would make two observations about the case. First, it
may be a good example of the problem of stretching the
constitutional fabric to cover new situations, and making it
thinner and thinner in the process. Second, the new regime of
Umbehr and O'Hare will have some challenging applications
right out of today's headlines. I am speaking about the so-called
X-Men, an affiliate of the black Muslim organization, the Nation
of Islam. The X-Men has a contract to provide security in public
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housing projects. From all accounts, they do so successfully. Can
the Governor order that the contract not be renewed because of
the ideology of the organization? Because they hand out
controversial leaflets on the premises? Can a county in a Western
State terminate the contract of a trash hauler if they find out he
weekends with the local Militia organization? Before this term,
those questions did not have to be addressed; now they may
become endemic.
III. COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE V. FEDERAL ELECTION
79
COMMISSION
Campaign finance is a constitutional and political and public
policy issue that has been on the front burner of the national
agenda for twenty years now. It was two decades ago, in Buckley
v. Valeo, 80 that the Court addressed the profound questions of
the power of Congress to ration and control political funding, and
thereby the political speech it sustains. 81 And we have been
struggling with those issues ever since. 82 This year the Court had
to decide an issue not reached in Buckle.,: whether political
expenditures by political parties are subject to limitation and
control.
The requirements of full disclosure require me to reveal that I
was one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Buckley who
challenged the post-Watergate campaign finance reforms as
systematically violative of core First Amendment principles and
79. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
80. 424 U.S. 1, 2 (1976).
81. Id.

82. Id. at 2. In Buckley, the appellants brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act on the grounds that this
limitation on individual expenditures and by contributions to campaigns
violated the candidates' rights to freedom of speech. Id. at 6. The Court held
that such restrictions were constitutional, but that expenditure limits were not
!d. at8.
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values. Further, I was of counsel to the ACLU amicus curiae
brief in the Colorado case this year. Perhaps even more
influential on my thinking was the fact that much earlier, as a
college summer intern, I worked for a California politician
named Jesse Unruh, who actually coined the phrase that "Money
is the mother's milk of politics.,, 83 So, you will have to take my
biases into account in assessing my assessment of this term's
campaign finance case.
In Buckley the Court carved two basic distinctions that have
driven the debate over campaign finance ever since. First, is the
distinction between "issue-oriented" political speech and "express
advocacy" of electoral results. The Court ruled that core First
Amendment principles protecting citizen speech about
government and politics totally prohibit government controls on
"issue-oriented" speech, even if the issue has to do with the
conduct and character of candidates for political office. Thus, the
message: "Smith is pro-choice, and that's good," cannot be
regulated or restrained by campaign finance laws. Only the
funding of messages of "express advocacy" of election or defeat
of a candidate - "Smith is pro-choice, vote for Smith" can validly
84
be subject to campaign finance laws.
Second, the Court drew a distinction between "expenditures"
and "contributions." The Court held that government controls on
expenditures, i.e. the spending of funds for partisan speech are
likewise unconstitutional as a direct abridgement of political
communication. Thus, candidates, campaign committees,
independent political committees, industry groups, trade
associations and labor organizations can spend as much as they
can raise on getting their partisan message out to the voters. Any
attempts to restrict such "expenditures" violate the First
83. Jesse Unruh, TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44.

84. The first distinction is between issue-oriented speech and express
advocacy. Judge Pratt and I were talking about a case that I had in front of him

many years ago that involved precisely this issue. If you say "Smith is for
lower taxes," stop. That's issue speech. If you say "Smith is for lower taxes,
vote for Smith", that's express advocacy. Issue speech is totally free from
federal, state, or local regulation. I am proud I helped achieve that.
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Amendment as well. But, the Court reasoned, limitations on
contributions to political candidates and committees, can be
subject to restriction in order to safeguard against the corrupting
effect that large contributions might have on political candidates
elected to office. Thus, political spending cannot be controlled,
but the political funding that sustains the political spending may
be subjected to reasonable limitations, such as $1,000 per
individual donor and $5,000 from political committees or PACs.
The Colorado campaign finance case 85 involved an attempt by
the government to blur both of those distinctions: to treat issue
speech about candidates as though it were express advocacy of
their election or defeat, thereby subject to controls, and to deem
all expenditures by a political party as though they were
"coordinated with" and therefore contributions to its candidates,
thereby subject to sharp limits. The Court bypassed the first
issue, and ruled against the government on the second one.
The case arose in the spring of 1986, when the Colorado
86
Republican campaign committee ran a series of radio spots
criticizing the voting record of Representative Tim Wirth, the
likely Democratic candidate for an open U.S. Senate seat. 87 The
Republicans had not even nominated their candidate yet, 88 and
the ads did not even mention any election. 89 But the Democrats
complained to the Federal Election Commission that the ads were
express advocacy. The Democrats further complained that
payment for them by the Republican party constituted not a
protected "expenditure" but an illegal contribution to the Senate
campaign of the yet-to-be-chosen Republican candidate because it
was made "in connection with" the Senate Campaign, and
therefore was to be treated as a contribution by the law. 90 The
85. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
86. Id. at 2312.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Id. at 2314.
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Federal Election Commission agreed with the Democrats on both
fronts and took the Republicans to federal court. 91 The District
Court ruled, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the ads
did not contain "express words of advocacy of election or defeat"
and therefore could not be deemed to be either "expenditures" or
"contributions" made "in connection with" the Senate
campaign. 92 They were pure free speech, not subject to any
controls, and the Commission's complaint had to be dismissed
without reaching any constitutional issues. The Tenth Circuit
reversed. It ruled that the ads could be construed as containing an
"electioneering message" and thereby subject to controls and
further, as a constitutional matter, that treating all party
expenditures as though they were coordinated with the party's
candidate and thus subject to limitation as though they were
contributions was valid under the First Amendment. 93
The Supreme Court reversed, seven to two. but with an array
of different approaches. 94 The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer
concluded that party expenditures, which are in fact
"independent" and not made in coordination or cooperation with
the candidate, are protected by the First Amendment and cannot
be limited. Although many have attacked the Buckley ruling,
Justice Breyer, reaffirmed the soundness of the basic Buckley
91. Id.

92. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (D.C. 1993). "The advertisement does not
contain any words which expressly advocate action. At best, as plaintiff
suggests, the Advertisement contains an indirect plea for action." Id.
93. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1024 (10th Cir. 1995). The court observed:

The Committee, stressing the benefits of party discipline and the broad
interests of party success, argues that the dangers of domination of
candidates by large individual donors do not apply to party expenditures.
But party expenditures, particularly pre-primary, often are controlled by

incumbent officeholders. We cannot say that the dangers of domination
that underlay the Supreme Court's acceptance of the constitutionality of

contribution limits are not present in political party expenditures.
Id.
94. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2321 (1996).
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distinction between expenditures and contributions. He found that
the ads were more like an "independent" expenditure than an
indirect campaign contribution and thus entitled to enjoy the
privileged status of the former rather than the circumscribed
status of the latter.
Quite significantly, in this regard, Justice Breyer rejected the
claim that there were "special dangers of corruption" associated
with expenditures by political parties that would tip the
constitutional balance in a different direction. This is the same
argument that appears repeatedly in editorial columns
condemning "slush money" or "sewer money" given by wealthy
individuals or even corporations to political parties. Justice
Breyer squarely confronted the arguments that because of such
unregulated and unlimited amounts of "soft money" contributions
to parties for a wide variety of other electoral actives,
unrestrained party spending posed the danger of corruption and
could be restrained. Justice Breyer concluded that "the
opportunity for corruption posed by these greater opportunities
for contributions is, at best, attenuated." 95 The law basically
restrains the ability to earmark or focus these contributions on
particular federal campaigns, and in any event, there is no
showing that a limit on expenditures by parties, particularly ones
made independent of any candidates, is a necessary measure to
control whatever problems may be posed by large contributions
to parties. The plurality's conclusion: "We therefore believe that
this Court's prior case law controls the outcome here. We do not
see how a Constitution that grants to individuals, candidates, and
ordinary political committees the right to make unlimited
independent expenditures could deny the same right to political
parties." 96
That having been said, there was only one issue left to resolve
and that was whether the expenditure could be viewed as
"independent." The government maintained that as a matter of
95. Id. at 2316.
96. Id. at 2317.
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law, any and all party spending had to be viewed not as an
independent expenditure, but as a coordinated expenditure, which
the law has treated as a contribution. The Court rejected the
argument finding no justification for it in the statute and no
warrant for it in the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court
ruled that "independent" party expenditures, like the one here,
were protected by the First Amendment. As a result, the Court
deflected the party's broader argument that, in the special
circumstances of political parties, the First Amendment forbids
congressional efforts to limit coordinated expenditures, as well as
independent expenditures. Justice Breyer thus declined to
confront the broader issues of whether all party expenditures,
truly independent or in fact coordinated, were protected by the
First Amendment.
Three other Justices, led by Justice Kennedy, would have
reached that issue and held that all expenditures by political
parties were completely protected against any restriction, thereby
invalidating the statute on its face. 97 In their view, the Buckley
protection for political expenditures, coupled with the historic
role of parties as speaking for their candidates, means that all
party spending to support its candidates, be it independent of or
coordinated with that candidate, is entitled to the same high level
of constitutional protection:
We have a constitutional tradition of political parties and their
candidates engaging in joint First Amendment activity; we also

have a practical identity of interests between the two entities
during an election. Party spending 'in cooperation, consultation,

or concert with' a candidate is indistinguishable in substance
from expenditures by the candidate or his campaign committee.
We held in Buckley that the First Amendment does not permit
regulation of the latter .

regulation of the former.,

. . ,

98

and it should not permit this

97. Id. at 2321. Justice Kennedy delivered a concurring opinion, in which
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined. Id.
98. Id. at 2323.
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While the Breyer plurality would protect independent party
expenditures, and the Kennedy concurrence would protect any
party expenditures, Justice Thomas took the most absolute First
Amendment position, namely, he would equally and fully protect
all political funding, contributions or expenditures under the First
Amendment. 99 In his view, Buckley was wrong to draw any
constitutional distinction between contributions and expenditures.
Both sides of the coin of political funding - giving to a candidate
or cause or spending by a candidate or cause - are direct
manifestations of the core essence of political speech and
association:
in sum, unlike the Buckley Court, I believe that contribution
limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon freedom of
political expression and association as do expenditure limits. The
protections of the First Amendment do not depend upon so fine a
line as that between spending money to support a candidate or
group and giving money to the candidate or groups to spend for
the same purposes. In principle, people and groups give money
to candidates and other groups for the same reason that they
spend money in support of those candidates and groups: because
they share social, economic, and political beliefs and seek to
100
have those beliefs affect governmental policy.
To Justice Thomas, federal bribery laws and campaign
disclosure laws are more focused and less drastic ways to deal
with the issues of improper access and undue influence "to make
donors and donee accountable to the public for any questionable
financial dealings in which they may engage." 10 1 Coincidentally.
that is the same position taken by the ACLU then in Buckley and
now as well.
Finally, the opposite view was taken by Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, namely, that "all money spent by a political
party to secure the election of its candidate for the office of
United States Senator should be considered a "contribution" to
99. Id. at 2321.
100. Id. at 2327-28.
101. Id. at 2329.
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his or her campaign. Like Justice Thomas, these two Justices also
questioned Buckley's distinction between contributions and
expenditures. But, unlike Justice Thomas, they would uphold
limitations on both on the ground that "the Government has an
important interest in leveling the electoral playing field by
102
constraining the cost of federal campaigns."
Despite the fact that only two Justices, Stevens and Ginsburg,
dissented favoring greater restraints on campaign funding, there
continues to be a drumbeat of editorial and political
condemnation of big giving and spending by parties and
candidates. The Federal Election Commission sues the Christian
Coalition, complaining that their voter guide materials constitute
"electioneering" and should be subject to statutory controls. That
is a frightening First Amendment prospect, which would
jeopardize the free speech of almost every issue group in
America that comments on candidates and officeholders.
President Clinton, who is in favor of campaign finance reform,
rakes in millions of dollars at Hollywood celebrity fund-raisers.
And Ross Perot spends $100,000,000 to put out the message that
there is too much money in politics.
The Court's Colorado ruling is important for local government
elections and campaigns because it makes it clear that party
spending is a separate and protected aspect of campaign
expenditures. That means that federal, state, or local efforts to
enact greater campaign funding restraints on candidates are
rendered even more likely to be futile, because there can not be
any caps on party spending. Since other groups, such as labor
unions, are also free to use their considerable resources to
influence the outcome of elections, the only people left restrained
will be candidates themselves, which hardly seems like the
proverbial level playing field.

102. Id. at 2332.
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IV. DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSORTIUM V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONo3
The last case I will discuss involved the intersection of two of
the most intractable doctrinal problems in the First Amendment
area: (1) how to characterize and treat cable television as a new
communications medium, and (2) to what extent to permit
government to regulate "indecent" communications, i.e. those
that are not quite legally obscene, and therefore are barely within
the ambit of First Amendment protection. As one Justice once put
it, the kind of stuff that "few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to
see .. ,,104 That latter quote is from the last of those 1976
cases that still haunt us today. That divided case, Young v.
American Mini-Theaters,10 5 upheld municipal zoning directed at

"adults only" books and magazines, material that was
constitutionally protected, but barely so. Two years later the
zoning case was the basis for applying similar concepts of
variable, contextual First Amendment protection to offensive
language on the radio - George Carlin's famous monologue about
"seven dirty words you definitely couldn't say on the radio." And

103. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
104. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50. 70 (1976).
105. 427 U.S. 50. In Young, a Detroit zoning ordinance prohibited adult
theatres from being used within 1000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or
within 500 feet of a residential area, unless there was a special waiver. Id. at
52. Cabarets, bars, hotels, and taxi dance halls are examples of "regulated
uses." Id. at 52. In violation of the ordinance, respondent Young operated
adult theatres that were located within the prescribed limits. Id. at 55. The
Court held that utilizing an ordinance in order to disperse sexually-oriented
businesses was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 72-73. The Court reasoned that distinguishing adult
theatres from other theatres was constitutional in that it was an attempt by the
city to preserve the moral integrity of the community. Id.
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this year, that Pacifica Foundation106 case was the direct
precedential justification for the prevailing opinion in the cable
indecency case. 107
The cable issues in the cable decency case are as pressing as
today's headlines about the efforts of New York City to compel
Time Warner to include Rupert Murdoch's 24-hour all news
cable network on their cable system and threatening franchise
penalties as a sanction for refusal. Are cable operators like
bookstores or telephone companies, like Barnes and Noble or
AT&T? 108 The decency issues in the cable decency case are as
momentous as those in the Internet decency case which the Court
will hear this term. And both sets of issues, although emanating
from federal law, have powerful consequences for state and local
government as well.
One final thing to note about the cable decency case. It was a
showcase for quite dramatically different judicial styles toward
the legal process of developing the law and addressing new and
perplexing questions. The approach and methodology of Justice
Breyer was a classic example of the legal process school
associated with the classic set of course materials of the same
name by Hart and Sachs. The emphasis is less on the abstract
contours of legal doctrine and more on the processes and
agencies for resolving legal issues, with a good deal of
willingness to defer to the administrative and political branches
and an instinct to fashion flexible legal doctrine which permits
such deference. Contrast that with the classic common law style
reflected in Justice Kennedy's opinion, with an emphasis on
categorization, characterization, analogic reasoning, logical
analysis and relatively hard rules. That approach has been the
hallmark of most First Amendment doctrine in recent years and it
has been thought to be an advance in protection for speech and
press. But in the two areas that intersect in the cable decency
106. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
107. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. at 2380 (1996).
108. Id. at 2320.
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case, cable and decency, the Court has had a harder time
employing this classic approach and has yielded more to the legal
process methodology. The result has been a decision which one
First Amendment advocate has called: "the nadir of the Court's
09
First Amendment jurisprudence." 1
The case involved provisions of the 1992 Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act. Federal law requires
cable operators to set aside certain channels for commercial lease
(leased access); and municipal franchise requirements frequently
require cable operators to set aside certain channels for "public,
educational, and governmental" use (public access or "PEG"
channels). 110 For many years, federal law barred cable operators
from exercising any editorial control over the content of
programs transmitted on both kinds of channels. 111 That meant
that. so long as the material was not legally obscene and thus
subject to complete prohibition, it could not be censored. 112 As a
result, in New York, we were regularly treated on leased access
to a diet of Al Goldstein's Midnight Blue and The Robin Byrd
Show who are, by the way, back on TV, as well as some pretty
113
raunchy stuff on "PEG" channels too. In the 1992 law.
Congress addressed this situation in three ways. First, in Section
10 (a) Congress let cable operators prohibit transmission on
leased access channels of any program that the operator
109.
216.
110.
2381.
111.
112.
113.

James Goodale, Caught in Breyer's Patch, N.Y. L.J. July 23, 1996. at
Denver Area Educ. Teleconnumications Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at
Id.
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 531 (1992). This section provides:

The Federal Communications Commission shall promulgate such
regulations as may be necessary to enable a cable operator of a cable
system to prohibit the use, on such system, of any channel capacity of
any public, educational, or governmental access facility for any
programming vhich contains obscene material, sexually explicit
conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct.
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"reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory
activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured
by contemporary standards." 114 That watered down test would
allow cable operators to ban the transmission of a wide variety of
legally protected sexual material, with an exceptionally vague
"patently offensive" standard. If cable operators wish to carry
such programs, Section 10(b) of the law said they must
"segregate and scramble" the programming, i.e. segregate the
programming on one particular channel and scramble the picture
unless viewers request it be unscrambled in writing and wait
thirty days for the service. 115 Finally, section 10(c) would allow
operators to ban indecent communications on PEG channels
without imposing a segregate and scramble requirement if they
allowed such programs. The new statute was challenged by
programmers and cable operators. and the Court in shifting
votes, upheld Section 10(a), giving operators power to censor
leased channels, by a vote of seven to two; 1 16 struck down
Section 10(b), the segregate and scramble provision, by a vote of
six to three, 117 and struck down the PEG channel restrictions by
a vote of five to four. 118 In the plurality's words:
[w]e conclude that the first provision -- that permits the operator
to decide whether or not to broadcast such programs on leased
channels -- is consistent with the First Amendment. The second
provision, that requires leased channel operators to segregate and
to block that programming, and the third provision, applicable to
public, educational, and governmental channels, violates the
114. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h), amending 47 U.S.C. § 612(h)(2).
115. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(j)(1)(A); § 532(j)(1)(B). This section provides in

pertinent part: "[t]he Commission shall promulgate regulations designed to
limit the access of children to indecent programming ... by - - A) requiring
cable operators to place on a single channel all indecent programs ...;(B)
requiring cable operators to block such single channel unless the subscriber
requests access to such channel in writing ...."Id.

116. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at
2384, 2390.

117. Id. at 2380. Justices Rehnquist, Thomas and Scalia filed an opinion,
delivered by Justice Thomas, concurring and dissenting in part.

118. Id. at 2397.
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First Amendment, for they are not appropriately tailored to
achieve the basic, legitimate objective of protecting children
from exposure to 'patently offensive' material. 119
Further, the different doctrinal approaches were as varied as
the votes. Justice Breyer wrote the prevailing plurality opinion.
As in the campaign finance case, he "eschewed a broad approach
120
in favor of a more ad hoc disposition of the case."
It was a battle of dueling analogies. The conservative Justices
(Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia) thought the cable operator was
like the owner of a bookstore and, as a matter of free speech and
private property rights, under few circumstances could
government tell him what books to shelve or what programs to
carry. The operator's paramount rights had to prevail over the
programmers who wanted to use the operator's facility against his
wishes, and the law simply recognized and embodied that right.
Thus, sections 10(a) and 10(c) were valid protections of the right
of operators to exercise editorial discretion and choice over what
gets put out on their communication media. 12 1 Section 10(b). on
blocking and scrambling, was a content-based limitation on cable
operators, by saying that if they chose to show indecent
programming, they would have to segregate and scramble it. But,
the conservatives felt that the need to protect unsuspecting
children from unwitting access to such material satisfied strict
scrutiny and justified the restraint on cable operators. 122
The two most liberal Justices on this issue, Justices Kennedy
and Ginsburg, took a diametrically opposed tack and would have
struck down all three provisions. As I have observed here on
previous occasions, Justice Kennedy has emerged as the Court's
most vigorous champion of free speech rights against government
interference and restraint, although this Term, Justice Thomas'
concurring opinions in the liquor advertising and the campaign
119.
120.
1996).
121.
122.

Id. at 2391.
Review of Supreme Court's Term, 65 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. Aug. 13.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2396.
Id.
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finance cases give Justice Kennedy a pretty good run for his
money in terms of vigorous and powerful protection of free
speech rights. Drawing heavily on the Court's First Amendment
categories and standards, Justice Kennedy condemned the
prevailing Justices opinion for being "adrift" and containing a
"flight from standards" and "an evasion of any clear legal
standard." In his mind, the Court's cases had established that
cable broadcasters were entitled to full First Amendment
protection, that indecency was a protected category of free
speech, but that cable companies, with respect to access channels,
could not properly be treated as private owners of communication
media but as publicly-sanctioned providers of media of
communication. 12 3 Thus, in this limited context, the analogy for
cable operators was not the bookstore, but the common carrier,
providing in the public and leased access channels, literally and
metaphorically, an avenue of communication. Moreover, the
avenue of communication is a "public forum" which cannot
exclude speakers because of the content of their speech unless the
strict scrutiny test is applied and satisfied, namely, unless the
exclusion is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
interest and is narrowly tailored to do so. Finding the goal of
protecting children against indecent speech on cable television to
be compelling, thus warranting some government regulation,
Justice Kennedy concluded, however, that the statute was not
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. For Justice Kennedy, this
result was straightforward and readily derived from reasoning by
analogy to existing doctrine.
However, Justice Breyer. for himself and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor and Souter, steered what appeared to be a middle
course between these two polar positions.
First, citing the rapid changes taking place in communications
technology, he refused to pick one analogy or precise First
Amendment formula to measure government regulation in this
emerging area or resolve the plethora of issues that he felt were

123. Id. at 2397.
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unresolved by the existing doctrinal framework. Instead, he
adopted an ad hoc test at every turn:
Rather than decide these issues, we can decide this case more
narrowly, by closely scrutinizing sec[tion] 10(a) to assure that it
properly addresses an extremely important problem, without
imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great
restriction on speech. The importance of the interest at stake
here-protecting children from exposure to patently offensive
depictions of sex; the accommodation of the interests of
programmers in maintaining access channels and of cable
operators in editing the contents of their channels; the similarity
of the problem and its solution to those at issue in Pacifica.
supra: and the flexibility inherent in an approach that permits
private cable operators to make editorial decisions, lead us to
conclude that see 10(a) is a sufficiently tailored response to an
extraordinarily important problem. 124
Surveying the various reasons why the statute satisfied this
approach and especially focusing on the regulatory history and
reasoning, his conclusion was similarly specific and fact-based:
The existence of this complex balance of interests persuades us
that the permissive nature of the provision, coupled with its
viewpoint-neutral application, is a constitutionally permissible
way to protect children from the type of sexual material that
concerned Congress, while accommodating both the First
Amendment interests served by the access requirements and
those served in restoring to cable operators a degree of the
editorial control that Congress removed in 1984.125
Applying this same sort of "semi-strict" scrutiny, the plurality
found that, on balance, the other two provisions could not pass
muster. Raising the kinds of questions that one might hear at an
administrative or legislative hearing, Justice Breyer viewed the
"segregate and scramble" provision as an excessive and
unnecessary imposition on those cable operators who wanted to
carry sexual material on their leased channels, on those
124. Id. at 2387.
125. Id. at 2385.
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programmers who wanted to supply it and on those adult viewers
who wanted access to it. Finally, the provision restricting
indecency on PEG channels, unlike that on leased channels, was
found to be unnecessary in light of the different "institutional
background," the relatively scant history of problems with such
materials on such channels and the greater network of local
licensing control and supervision.
Though presenting itself as tentative and interim, the prevailing
opinion, by declining to employ traditional categories and
doctrines, did in effect stake out new ground. It fashioned a
watered down formula for dealing the issues - a kind of strict
scrutiny "lite." It invoked the Pacifica case as its guiding
precedent, despite material differences between free radio
broadcast and subscription cable television where the parental
ability to protect unsuspecting children is concerned, and
undercut the relatively robust protection previously afforded to
cable operators. One First Amendment advocate said that the
standard is a nadir for First Amendment jurisprudence. It is so
watered down. It is so without content, character, and integrity.
If the government could win any First Amendment case by using
that standard, there would not be much of the First Amendment
left standing. But that was the prevailing standard in the case. It
was used, as I said, to uphold the provision that let cable
operators get certain kinds of materials off of leased access
stations and then strike down the other two portions of the law.
The bottom line for this case is that greater control is given to
cable operators, but not too much censorship control is given in
terms of blocking and scrambling. Justice Souter's concurring
opinion supported this "go slow" approach because "all of the
relevant characteristics of cable are presently in a state of
technological and regulatory flux." And, more importantly:
As cable and telephone companies begin their competition for
control over the single wire that will carry both their services,
we can hardly settle rules for review of regulation on the
assumption that cable will remain a separate and useful category
of First Amendment scrutiny. And as broadcast, cable and the
cyber-technology of the Internet and the World Wide Web
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approach the day of using a common receiver, we can hardly
assume that standards for judging the regulation of one of them
will not have immense, but now unknown and unknowable,
effects on the others. 12 6
CONCLUSION
Which brings me back to the future. On the Court's docket
right now is round two on the issue of whether cable operators
"must carry" broadcast stations and other channels. In its 1992
Turner Broadcastingdecision, the Court remanded the matter for
further proceedings, which have now come back. 127 But lurking
beyond the cable case is the Mothership of them all - the Internet
and the Internet decency case. 128 This year's cable decency case
was watched closely not just because of its actual effect on cable
programming, but, as well, for its precedential impact on the
Internet case. Earlier this year, two separate federal courts ruled
unconstitutional the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
which restricts "indecent" computer transmissions on the
Internet, where the communicator would know or have reason to
know that minors would have access to the transmission. Since
many view the Internet as the ultimate 21st century technological
realization of the Framers' 18th century visionary promise of
freedom of speech and of the press, the Court's decision may
well be of monumental significance. The cable decency decision
is not much of a guide as to how the Court will deal with the
126. Id. at 2402.

127. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n. No. 95-992, 1995 WL 769992 (1996). In Turner the District Court.
by a 2-1 vote, upheld on remand the challenged statutory provisions, which
require cable companies to carry broadcast stations. The case was argued again
before the United States Supreme Court on October 7. 1996).
128. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, No. 96-511, 1997 WL 74378
(1997) (arguing that the Communications Decency Act of 1996. which imposes
criminal penalties upon anyone who, via on-line computer communications,
transmits to minors any material that is "indecent" or "patently offensive," is
unconstitutional).
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Internet case. Therefore, in the words of that great legal
philosopher Mort Sahl, "[t]he future lies ahead." Thank you.

